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Abstract
The International Telecommunications Satellite Organization (INTELSAT), the 109-nation
cooperative responsible for the vast majority of international satellite service, was recently pre-
sented with what may be its greatest challenge since its inception over twenty years ago. The
consortium, hailed by many as a model among international organizations, faces possible competi-
tion from five American companies (Applicants) that have applied to the Federal Communications
Commission (FCC) for permission to launch and operate satellites independent of the INTEL-
SAT system. This Note begins with a brief look at the laws applicable to international satellite
communications. The various interpretations given those laws will be set forth, along with policy
and other reasons for approving or not approving the applications. Among the views considered
are those of the Applicants, the President of the United States, the International Telecommuni-
cations Satellite Organization, the Communications Satellite Corporation (Comsat), and the FCC.
An analysis of the conflicting views follows. From this analysis, it is concluded that the President’s
endorsement of limited competition is a reasonable stand, because it enables the United States to
meet its international obligations, while furthering the national interest.
BYPASSING INTELSAT: FAIR COMPETITION OR
VIOLATION OF THE INTELSAT AGREEMENT?
INTRODUCTION
The International Telecommunications Satellite Organi-
zation' (INTELSAT), the 109-nation cooperative responsible
for the vast majority of international satellite service, 2 was re-
cently presented with what may be its greatest challenge since
its inception over twenty years ago. The consortium, hailed by
many as a model among international organizations,3 faces
1. The International Telecommunications Satellite Organization (INTELSAT)
was created pursuant to the Agreement Establishing Interim Arrangements for a
Global Commercial Communications Satellite System, Aug. 20, 1964, 15 U.S.T.
1705, T.I.A.S. No. 5646, 514 U.N.T.S. 26 [hereinafter cited as Interim Arrangements
Agreement]. This agreement was superseded by the Agreement Relating to the In-
ternational Telecommunications Satellite Organization, Aug. 20, 1971, 23 U.S.T.
3813, T.I.A.S. No. 7532 [hereinafter cited as INTELSAT Agreement]; Operating
Agreement Relating to the International Telecommunications Satellite Organization,
Aug. 20, 1971, 23 U.S.T. 4091, T.I.A.S. No. 7532 [hereinafter cited as Operating
Agreement].
INTELSAT is owned by its signatories. See infra note 39. Each signatory holds
an investment share based on that country's current use of the system. The United
States' investment share is approximately 24%. Foreign Policy Considerations in Interna-
tional Communications Satellites at 12, in INTERNATIONAL SATELLITE POLICY (Senior Inter-
agency Group on International Communication & Information Policy ed. Jan. 18,
1984) [hereinafter cited as Foreign Policy Considerations].
2. INTELSAT provides two-thirds of the world's international telephone ser-
vice, almost all international television transmission, most telex service, teleconfer-
encing, and many kinds of data transmission. Colino, The System WorAs, Don't Fix It,
N.Y. Times, Mar. 3, 1985, § 3, at 2, col. 3.
The following is a much-simplified description of how international satellite
communications work: Assume that the New York branch of an international broker-
age firm wants direct contact via a private line with its branch in London. The cus-
tomer would contact an international record carrier (IRC), such as RCA or ITT,
which would arrange to provide the service needed to transmit messages from New
York to London. The IRC would have to obtain a local channel connecting the cus-
tomer's office with the IRC's operating center, and a domestic channel connecting
the IRC's operating center with a Comsat earth station in Etam, We:,t Virginia, or
Andover, Maine. Comsat would then provide the service from one of these earth
stations to an INTELSAT satellite. This same arrangement would be made in re-
verse on the other side of the Atlantic, with British Telecommunications Public Lim-
ited Company serving as Comsat's counterpart. See Letter from Leonard J. Higgins,
Administrator of Regulatory Affairs for RCA American Communications, to Julianne
McKenna (Apr. 17, 1985) (copy on file at the offices of the Fordham International Law
Journal). For a more detailed description of how satellite signal transmission oper-
ates, see Note, Signal Piracy: The Theft of United States Satellite Signals, 8 FORDHAM INT'L
L.J. 62, 63 n.4 (1984).
3. See generally Lawson, Impact of Competition on INTELSAT Studied, 43 CONG. Q.
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possible competition from five American companies (Appli-
cants) that have applied to the Federal Communications Com-
mission4 (FCC) for permission to launch and operate satellites
independent of the INTELSAT system.5 The Applicants are
362 (Feb. 23, 1985); Stuart, INTELSAT. Time of Uncertainty, N.Y. Times, Nov. 10,
1984, at 31, col. 3, at 38, col. 7.
4. The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) is "an independent United
States government agency, responsible directly to Congress. Established by the
Communications Act of 1934, [47 U.S.C. § 151 (1982)], it is charged with regulating
interstate and international communications by radio, television, wire, satellite and
cable." Federal Communications Commission, The FCC in Brief 1 (1983) (informa-
tion bulletin).
5. The Applicants are Orion Satellite Corp. (Orion), International Satellite, Inc.
(ISI), RCA American Communications, Inc. (RCA), Cygnus Satellite Corp. (Cygnus),
and Pan American Satellite Corp. (PanAmSat).
Orion's proposed system would consist of two in-orbit satellites and one ground
spare. Application of Orion Satellite Corp., CSS No. 83-002-P, at I-1 (FCC Mar. 11,
1983) (application for an international communications satellite system) [hereinafter
cited as Orion Application]. Its signals would cover the eastern portion of North
America and Western Europe. Id. The satellites would be designed to provide
video, data, and audio services. Id. at 1-5; see In re Establishment of Satellite Systems
Providing International Communications, CC No. 84-1299, at 3-4 (FCCJan. 4, 1985)
(notice of inquiry and proposed rulemaking) [hereinafter cited as Notice of Inquiry].
ISI's proposed system would also consist of two in-orbit satellites and one
ground spare. Application of International Satellite, Inc., CSS No. 83-004-P (LA), I-
P-C No. 83-073, at ii (FCC Aug. 12, 1983) (application for an international communi-
cations satellite system) [hereinafter cited as ISI Application]. Its signals would cover
the contiguous United States and Western Europe to the Adriatic Sea. Id. at 1.
Video, audio, and data services would be offered. Id. at 1-2. ISI states that it would
use a portion of its capacity to provide services on a tariffed, common carrier basis.
Id. at 2; see Notice of Inquiry, supra, at 4.
RCA's proposed system would consist of six transponders on a previously au-
thorized domestic satellite. Application of RCA American Communications, Inc., I-
T-C No. 84-085, at 1 (FCC Feb. 13, 1984) (application for an international communi-
cations satellite system) [hereinafter cited as RCA Application]. The contiguous
United States and portions of Europe and Africa would be covered. Id. The tran-
sponders would be used for video distribution, teleconferencing, private leased
voice, and low-speed and medium-speed data communications. Id. at 2; see Notice of
Inquiry, supra, at 5.
Cygnus' proposed system would also consist of two in-orbit satellites and one
ground spare. Application of Cygnus Satellite Corp., CSS No. 84-002-P (LA) (FCC
Mar. 7, 1984) (application for an international communications satellite system)
[hereinafter cited as Cygnus Application]. Its signals would cover the contiguous
United States and Western Europe, and, in addition, would have a spot beam so as to
provide service to Puerto Rico, the United States Virgin Islands, the Caribbean Ba-
sin, and parts of Central America. Video, voice, and data services would be provided.
See Notice of Inquiry, supra, at 4.
PanAmSat's system would consist of two satellites only, one in-orbit and one
ground spare. Application of Pan American Satellite Corp., CSS No. 84-004-P (LA),
at 2-3 (FCC May 31, 1984) (application for an international communications satellite
system) [hereinafter cited as PanAmSat Application]. One-third of the satellites'
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Orion Satellite Corporation (Orion), International Satellite,
Inc. (ISI), RCA American Communications, Inc. (RCA), and
Cygnus Satellite Corporation (Cygnus), which have proposed
new transatlantic communications systems, and Pan American
Satellite Corporation (PanAmSat), which seeks to establish a
system between North and South America.
The filing of these applications with the FCC prompted
action by the Executive Branch, which, under the Communica-
tions Satellite Act of 1962,6 is responsible for determining
whether additional international satellite systems are "re-
quired in the national interest."7 The culmination of this activ-
ity was a memorandum from President Reagan to the Secretar-
ies of State and Commerce indicating that additional interna-
tional satellite systems are indeed required in the national
interest, and directing that the United States consult with IN-
TELSAT regarding the separate systems, as required under
the treaty that created the organization. 8 Additionally, the Sec-
retaries were instructed by the President to inform ithe FCC of
criteria necessary "to ensure that the United States meets its
international obligations and to further its telecommunications
and foreign policy interests." 9 Ajoint letter from the Secretar-
ies10 setting forth those criteria is now before the FCC, which
has invited public comment on the idea of private competi-
tion." If the FCC approves the proposed systems, the United
transponders would be used for international traffic between North and South
America. Id. at 3. The remaining transponders would be used for domestic service
in South America. Id. The satellites would be designed to provide audio and video
distribution services. Id. at 2; see Notice of Inquiry, supra, at 5.
6. 47 U.S.C. § 701 (1982).
7. Id. § 721(a)(6). The President shall "take all necessary steps to insure the
availability and appropriate utilization of the communications satellite system for
general governmental purposes except where a separate communications satellite
system is required to meet unique governmental needs, or is otherwise required in
the national interest .... ." Id.; see id. § 701(d).
8. Memorandum for the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Commerce, 20
WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1853 (Dec. 3, 1984) [hereinafter cited as Presidential De-
termination].
9. Id.
10. Letter from George P. Shultz, Secretary of State, and Malcolm Baldrige, Sec-
retary of Commerce, to Mark S. Fowler, Chairman of Federal Communications Com-
mission (Nov. 28, 1984).
11. Notice of Inquiry, supra note 5, at 26. The deadlines for comments and reply
comments were originally February 14, 1985, and March 7, 1985. Id. The deadlines
were later extended to April 1, 1985, and June 5, 1985. In re Establishment of Satel-
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States will then consult with INTELSAT regarding the coordi-
nation' 2 of these systems with INTELSAT. 3  However, IN-
TELSAT has made clear its opposition to the proposed sys-
tems, 14 making successful coordination unlikely.
This Note begins with a brief look at the laws applicable to
international satellite communications." 5 The various inter-
pretations given those laws will be set forth, along with policy
and other reasons for approving or not approving the applica-
tions. 1 6 Among the views considered are those of the Appli-
cants, the President, INTELSAT, the Communications Satel-
lite Corporation' 7 (Comsat), and the FCC. An analysis of the
conflicting views follows.' 8 From this analysis, it is concluded
that the President's endorsement of limited competition is a
reasonable stand, because it enables the United States to meet
its international obligations, while furthering the national in-
terest.
I. THE LA W RELATING TO SATELLITE SERVICE
A. The Creation of Cornsat: The Satellite Act
The Communications Satellite Act of 196219 (Satellite Act)
is the primary embodiment of United States policy on satel-
lites. 21 It called for the creation of a commercial communica-
lite Systems Providing International Communications, CC No. 84-1299 (FCCJan. 25,
1985) (order).
12. For the purposes of this Note, "coordination" means consultation with IN-
TELSAT under the INTELSAT Agreement, supra note 1, arts. XIV(d)-(e).
13. See Presidential Determination, supra note 8, at 1853.
14. See infra notes 161-92 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 19-71 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 72-208 and accompanying text.
17. Comsat is the United States' signatory to the INTELSAT Agreement, supra
note 1, created pursuant to the Communications Satellite Act, 47 U.S.C. § 701
(1982). It provides the connection between INTELSAT satellites and United States
earth stations. Comsat World Services Marketing, International Communications
Services (promotional brochure).
18. See infra notes 209-31 and accompanying text.
19. 47 U.S.C. § 701 (1982).
20. Id. Among the United States' international communications and information
policy goals are the enhancement of the free flow of information and ideas among
nations, the promotion of harmonious international relations, the development of
services responsive to the requirements of trade and commerce, and the continuation
of United States leadership in the communications, information, and aerospace
fields. Senior Interagency Group on International Communication and Information
Policy, A White Paper on New International Satellite Systems 5 (Feb. 1985).
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tions satellite system that would serve the needs of the United
States and other countries and "contribute to world peace and
understanding."' 2' United States participation in the system,
now known as INTELSAT, was to be in the form of a private
corporation subject to governmental regulation. 22
Comsat is the corporation established as a result of the
Satellite Act to be the United States' representative to INTEL-
SAT. 23 Comsat is presently primarily engaged in providing in-
ternational, domestic, and maritime satellite communications
24services. Its function in the international arena is that of a
carrier's carrier; it provides the connection between INTEL-
SAT satellites and United States earth stations 25 for carriers
such as American Telephone and Telegraph and RCA.26
Charged with authority for overseeing Comsat are the
President of the United States, who ensures that the corpora-
tion operates according to the objectives of the United States
in establishing a global system that contributes to world peace
and understanding;27 the National Aeronautics and Space Ad-
ministration (NASA), which serves as a technical consultant
and furnishes launch facilities; 28 the FCC, which is given exten-
21. 47 U.S.C. § 701(a).
22. Id. §§ 731-44. Specifically, the Act called for the formation of "a communi-
cations satellite corporation for profit which will not be an agency or establishment of
the United States Government. The corporation shall be subject to the provisions of
this chapter .... " Id. § 731.
23. See generally D. SMITH, COMMUNICATION VIA SATELLITE 93-120 (1976); Note,
The Communications Satellite Corporation: Toward a Workable Telecommunications Policy, 27
HASTINGS L.J. 721 (1976) (both discussing the creation and development of Comsat).
24. Comsat, Comsat Guide to the INTELSAT and INMARSAT Satellite Systems
2 (promotional brochure). Comsat also performs specialized operational and techni-
cal functions such as training, maintenance, and research for INTELSAT, under spe-
cial arrangements apart from the INTELSAT Agreements. Id.
25. An earth station has been defined as "an antenna, often saucer shaped, elec-
tronically equipped either to receive signals from satellites, to transmit signals back,
or to do both." HOUSE COMM. ON SMALL BUSINESS, THE IMPACT OF CHANGES IN THE
TELECOMMUNICATIONS INDUSTRY ON SMALL BUSINESS, H.R. REP. No. 1171, 98th
Cong., 2d Sess. 46 (1984).
26. Comsat World Systems Marketing, International Communications Services
(promotional brochure). Recently, Comsat was given permission by the FCC to offer
its services directly to end users, such as large corporations, via a subsidiary. Author-
ized User Policy, 90 F.C.C.2d 1934 (1982) (report and order). Carriers and end
users cannot obtain services directly from INTELSAT; they must do so through
Comsat. See Comsat World Systems Marketing, International Communications Serv-
ices (promotional brochure).
27. 47 U.S.C. § 721(a).
28. Id. § 721(b).
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sive regulatory control over the corporation's activities;2 9 and
the State Department, which advises the corporation on rele-
vant foreign policy considerations.30
In its initial years, INTELSAT was dominated by Comsat,
partly because the United States was so technically advanced in
the satellite field.3 This angered some states, and the Union
of Soviet Socialist Republics (Soviet Union) used Comsat's
dominance as an excuse for its refusal to join the organiza-
tion.3 2  The Soviet Union organized, instead, a rival system,
known as Intersputnik, which consists almost exclusively of
communist nations.s
B. The INTELSAT Agreements
As a member of the INTELSAT organization, the United
States is obliged to consult with INTELSAT regarding the
technical and, possibly, economic effects of any proposed sys-
tems on the INTELSAT organization. 34 A brief description of
the organization's governing structure is therefore necessary
in order to gain an understanding of the way INTELSAT will
address the issue of competing systems, should they be author-
ized by the FCC.
1. INTELSAT'S Organizational Structure
INTELSAT is composed of four different bodies, ensuring
adequate technical and political representation. 5 These units
29. Id. § 721 (c).
30. Id. § 721(c)(3); see Act of Nov. 22, 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-164, § 35, 97 Stat.
1017, 1025-26 (1983) (codified at 22 U.S.C.A. § 2707 (West Supp. 1984)) (establish-
ing the Office of the Coordinator for International Communications and Information
Policy); Dougan Describes New Telecommunications and Information Office at State Dept., Ques-
tions Ideas for Govt. Reorganization, Satellite Week, June 6, 1983, at 6, 6-8.
31. See Note, Comsat's First Decade: Difficulties in Interpreting the Communications Satel-
lite Act of 1962, 7 GA.J. INT'L & CoMP. L. 678, 686-89 (1977); Note, The Communications
Satellite Corporation: Toward a Workable Telecommunications Policy, 27 HASTINGS L.J. 721,
739-42 (1976).
32. See Shillinglaw, The Soviet Union and International Satellite Telecommunications, 5
STAN. J. INT'L STUD. 199, 203-07 (1970); Smith, The Legal Ordering of Satellite Telecommu-
nications: Problems and Alternatives, 44 IND. L.J. 337, 349-50 (1969).
33. See Doyle, An Analysis of the Socialist States' Proposal for Intersputnik: An Interna-
tional Communication Satellite System, 15 VILL. L. REV. 83 (1969); Shillinglaw, supra note
32, at 199-226.
34. INTELSAT Agreement, supra note 1, arts. XIV(d)-(e).
35. Id. art. VI(a).
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are known as the Assembly of Parties, the Meeting of Signato-
ries, the Board of Governors, and the Executive Organ.
The Assembly of Parties is composed of representatives of
the member countries of INTELSAT.16 It meets every other
year to discuss "those aspects of INTELSAT which are primar-
ily of interest to the parties as sovereign states."3 7 Each party
is accorded one vote.3 8
The Meeting of the Signatories annually unites all signato-
ries, 3 1 who are concerned primarily with the financial, techni-
cal, and operational aspects of the INTELSAT system.4 °
Among the signatories' responsibilities are the establishment
of general rules regarding the approval of earth stations for
access to INTELSAT satellites, the allotment of satellite capac-
ity, and the establishment and adjustment of the charges for
the use of INTELSAT satellites.4 As in the Assembly of Par-
ties, each signatory is accorded one vote.42
The Board of Governors (Board) is the third of INTEL-
SAT's four governing bodies. It is composed primarily of
those signatories whose investment shares, 43 individually or in
groups, are more than a specified amount.44 The unit meets
every twelve to fourteen weeks, and is responsible for making
decisions regarding the design, development, establishment,
operation, and maintenance of the space segment.45 Decisions
36. Id. art. VII(a); see id. art. I(f); INTELSAT, The Global Telecommunications
Cooperative 7 (promotional brochure).
37. INTELSAT Agreement, supra note 1, arts. VII(b), VII(d).
38. Id. art. VII(f).
39. The signatories are either the member governments or their designated
telecommunications entities. Id. arts. VII(a), VII(c). Comsat is the United States'
signatory. See supra note 23.
40. INTELSAT Agreement, supra note 1, art. VIII(b).
41. Id. art. VIII(b)(v)(A)-(C).
42. Id. art. VIII(e).
43. "Investment shares" are based on the relative use of the INTELSAT system
by member countries and are calculated in March of each year. Use is neasured in
terms of utilization charges, which are based on the nature and volume of service and
the applicable rates. Operating Agreement, supra note 1, arts. 6, 8; see INTELSAT,
The Global Telecommunications Cooperative 7 (promotional brochure); see also
Mizrack, The INTELSAT Definitive Arrangements, I J. SPACE L. 129, 134-35 (1973) (re-
garding financial arrangements for the INTELSAT system).
44. INTELSAT Agreement, supra note 1, arts. IX(a)-(b).
45. Id. art. X(a). " 'Space segment' means the telecommunications satellites,
and the tracking, telemetry, command, control, monitoring and related facilities and
equipment required to support the operation of these satellites." Id. art. I(h); see
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are taken by weighted vote, with each governor casting a vote
equal to the investment of those signatories he represents.4 6
The Executive Organ, with a staff of about 550,47 is re-
sponsible for the day-to-day management of INTELSAT. 41 It
is headed by the Director General, who reports to the Board of
Governors ."9
2. Key Provisions
INTELSAT is governed by two international agreements.
The first, referred to as simply the "Agreement," sets forth the
basic provisions, principles, and structure of the organiza-
tion.50 It was signed by the members through their foreign
ministries. 5' The other document, referred to as the "Operat-
ing Agreement," sets forth more detailed financial and techni-
cal provisions.52 It was signed by the members through their
governments or their designated telecommunications entities,
public or private.53
The goal of the INTELSAT organization is the creation of
a "single global commercial telecommunications satellite sys-
tem as part of an improved global telecommunications net-
work which will provide expanded telecommunications serv-
INTELSAT, The Global Telecommunications Cooperative 7 (promotional
brochure).
46. INTELSAT Agreement, supra note 1, art. IX(f); see also id. art. IX(j).
47. INTELSAT, The Global Telecommunications Cooperative 7 (promotional
brochure).
48. INTELSAT Agreement, supra note 1, art. XI(b)(i); see INTELSAT, The
Global Telecommunications Cooperative 7 (promotional brochure).
49. INTELSAT Agreement, supra note 1, art. XI(b)(i).
Currently serving as Director General is, for the first time, an American citizen,
Richard Colino. He works out of the consortium's recently built U.S.$50 million
headquarters in Washington, D.C. Stuart, INTELSAT: Time of Uncertainty, N.Y.
Times, Nov. 10, 1984, at 31, col. 3. Prior to assuming the post of Director General of
INTELSAT, Colino served as president and chief executive officer of a broadcasting
and telecommunications consulting firm, held the same offices with a subscription
television company, and was vice president of international operations with Comsat.
He was the United States' representative to INTELSAT on several occasions, and at
one point served as Chairman of the Board of Governors of INTELSAT. INTEL-
SAT, Richard R. Colino Biographical Sketch and Curriculum Vitae.
50. INTELSAT Agreement, supra note 1.
51. Id. art. XIX(a). "This Agreement shall be open for signature . . .by the
Government of any State party to the Interim Agreement .. .[or] by the Govern-
ment of any other State member of the International Telecommunication Union." Id.
52. Operating Agreement, supra note 1.
53. See INTELSAT Agreement, supra note 1, art. 1 (b).
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ices to all areas of the world and which will contribute to world
peace and understanding."54 This system is to "provide, for
the benefit of all mankind, through the most advanced technol-
ogy available, the most efficient and economic facilities possi-
ble consistent with the best and most equitable use of the radio
frequency spectrum and of orbital space."' 55 While this lan-
guage appears to make plain the parties' intentions, there are
conflicting views as to what is meant by a "single" system that
is "part of an improved . . . network."
Article 1 sets forth the definitions of terms used in the
Agreement. "Public telecommunications services" are de-
scribed as:
fixed or mobile telecommunications services which can be
provided by satellite and which are available for use by the
public, such as telephony, telegraphy, telex, facsimile, data
transmission, transmission of radio and television programs
between approved earth stations having access to the IN-
TELSAT space segment for further transmission t-o the
public, and leased circuits for any of these purposes; but ex-
cluding those mobile services of a type not provided under
the Interim Agreement and the Special Agreement . .56
"Specialized telecommunications services" are described as
"telecommunications services which can be provided by satel-
lite, other than . . . [public telecommunications services], in-
cluding, but not limited to, radio navigation services, broad-
casting satellite services for reception by the general public,
space research services, meteorological services, and earth re-
sources services." 57 There is some debate as to whether the
services proposed by Orion should be classified as either "pub-
lic telecommunications services" or "specialized telecommuni-
cations services." The label given to the proposed services is
important, because the extent of consultation5" required by
INTELSAT, and hence the difficulty of gaining INTELSAT ap-
proval, varies with the type of service.59 Competing systems
54. Id. preamble.
55. Id.
56. Id. art I(k).
57. Id. art. I(l).
58. "Consultation" refers to the furnishing of information and meetings re-
quired between the Assembly of Parties and one who intends to use space segment
facilities separate from the INTELSAT space segment. See id. arts. XIV(c)-(e).
59. Id.
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designed to meet "international public telecommunications
services requirements" must be coordinated not only with re-
spect to technical compatibility, but also with respect to the
avoidance of "significant economic harm" to the INTELSAT
system.6" Competing systems designed to meet "specialized
telecommunications service requirements, domestic or inter-
national" need only be coordinated with respect to technical
compatibility.61
Article V(d) of the Agreement, 62 which deals with rates, is
60. Id. art. XIV(d). This article provides that:
To the extent that any Party or Signatory or person within the jurisdic-
tion of a Party intends individually or jointly to establish, acquire or utilize
space segment facilities separate from the INTELSAT space segment facili-
ties to meet its international public telecommunications services require-
ments, such Party or Signatory, prior to the establishment, acquisition or
utilization of such facilities, shall furnish all relevant information to and shall
consult with the Assembly of Parties, through the Board of Governors, to
ensure technical compatibility of such facilities and their operation with the
use of the radio frequency spectrum and orbital space by the existing or
planned INTELSAT space segment and to avoid significant economic harm
to the global system of INTELSAT. Upon such consultation, the Assembly
of Parties, taking into account the advice of the Board of Governors, shall
express, in the form of recommendations, its findings regarding the consid-
erations set out in this paragraph, and further regarding the assurance that
the provision or utilization of such facilities shall not prejudice the establish-
ment of direct telecommunication links through the INTELSAT space seg-
ment.
Id.
61. Id. art. XIV(e). This article provides that:
To the extent that any Party or Signatory or person within the jurisdic-
tion of a party intends to establish, acquire or utilize space segment facilities
separate from the INTELSAT space segment facilities to meet its specialized
telecommunications services requirements, domestic or international, such
Party or Signatory, prior to the establishment, acquisition or utilization of
such facilities, shall furnish all relevant information to the Assembly of Par-
ties, through the Board of Governors. The Assembly of Parties, taking into
account the advice of the Board of Governors, shall express, in the form of
recommendations, its findings regarding the technical compatibility of such
facilities and their operation with the use of the radio frequency spectrum
and orbital space by the existing or planned INTELSAT space segment.
Id.
62. Id. art. V(d). Article V(d) provides that:
All users of the INTELSAT space segment shall pay utilization charges
determined in accordance with the provisions of this Agreement and the
Operating Agreement. The rates of space segment utilization charge for
each type of utilization shall be the same for all applicants for space segment
capacity for that type of utilization.
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also a subject of controversy. This section sets out the INTEL-
SAT practice of averaging its costs worldwide.63 Regardless of
the origin or destination of a message, its sender is charged the
same rate, depending on the type of service employed. 64 Reve-
nues from high-volume routes, such as the North Atlantic,
make it possible for INTELSAT to subsidize rates for service
to and from developing nations.65 Those favoring competition
with INTELSAT have raised the possibility of amending the
INTELSAT Agreement so as to effect a change in pricing, in
order that INTELSAT may remain competitive if competition
is allowed.66
Article XIV of the Agreement sets forth the rights and ob-
ligations of INTELSAT members.6 7 It begins by instructing
the parties and signatories that they are obliged to act in ac-
cordance with the principles set forth in the preamble and the
rest of the Agreement. 68 Despite the requirement that a po-
tential competitor merely consult with the Assembly of Par-
ties,6 9 an obligation to abide by the consortium's decision re-
garding the establishment of separate systems has been found
indirectly in this prefatory language. 70 According to INTEL-
63. See id.; Stuart, Intelsat: Time of Uncertainty, N.Y. Times, Nov. 10, '1984, at 31,
col. 3, at 34, cols. 5-6.
64. Lowndes, FCC Considers Policy Favoring Competition with INTELSA T, Aviation
Week & Space Tech., Jan. 7, 1985, at 24; Stuart, Reagan Endorses Limited Intelsat
Competition, N.Y. Times, Nov. 29, 1984, at D7, cols. 1, 6.
65. Stuart, Intelsat: Time of Uncertainty, N.Y. Times, Nov. 10, 1984, at 11, col. 3, at
34, cols. 5-6.
66. Stuart, Reagan Endorses Limited Intelsat Competition, N.Y. Times, Nov. 28, 1984,
at D7, cols. 1, 5.
67. INTELSAT Agreement, supra note 1, art. XIV. In sum, article XIV gives all
parties and signatories the right to participate in all INTELSAT meetings and sets
forth the procedure to be followed in the event that any party or signatory seeks to
employ space segment facilities other than those of INTELSAT. Id.
68. Id. art. XIV(a).
69. Id. arts. XIV(c)-(e).
70. R. Colino, Review of Certain Obligations of INTELSAT Member:; Under the
INTELSAT Agreements, With Particular Reference to Article XIV(d), Attachment
No. I to BG-60-62E, at 6-8 (Aug. 15, 1984) (INTELSAT document) [hereinafter
cited as Review of Obligations]. Note that the document indicates that it is neither a
proposal nor a recommendation, but merely for the signatories' information. Id. at 1.
Article XVI sets forth the penalty for failure to comply with the terms of the
Agreement or Operating Agreement: A breaching party may be deemed to have
withdrawn from the organization. INTELSAT Agreement, supra note 1, art.
XIV(b)(i). If the breach gives rise to a dispute between INTELSAT and 1ihe default-
ing party or signatory, and a settlement is not reached within a reasonable time,
under article XVIII, the dispute is submitted to arbitration. Id. art. XVIII(a)-(b). The
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SAT's Director General, the authorization of a separate system
in the face of a negative decision might constitute a breach of
this vague provision.7 1
II. THE VIEWS ON COMPETITION
A. The Applicants
Orion, Cygnus, RCA, ISI, and PanAmSat assert that, as
new entrants in the international satellite field, they will foster
the development of new telecommunications services more ac-
curately reflecting consumer demand. 72 They claim that IN-
TELSAT does not currently offer, nor intend to offer, many of
the services they seek to provide.73
According to the Applicants, increased competition in
video, data, and private line voice services would be but a logi-
cal extension of prior decisions made by the FCC in the area of
domestic communications.74 This increased competition, the
Applicants say, will make INTELSAT more responsive to the
arbital tribunal consists of three members chosen in accordance with procedures set
forth in a special annex to the Agreement. Id. annex C, art. 2. The tribunal's deci-
sion is binding. Id. annex C, art. 13(b).
71. Review of Obligations, supra note 70.
72. Orion Application, supra note 5, at 1-2 through 1-5; ISI Application, supra
note 5, at 27-28; RCA Application, supra note 5, at 11-13; Cygnus Application, supra
note 5, at 52; PanAmSat Application, supra note 5, at 32-33.
73. Cygnus Application, supra note 5, at 52; see PanAmSat Application, supra
note 5, at 32; ISI Application, supra note 5, at 7-8; Orion Application, supra note 5, at
I-1.
It has been alleged that some services recently introduced by INTELSAT were
prompted, or at least hastened, by the Applicants' petitions to the FCC. RCA Appli-
cation, supra note 5, at 13. Perhaps the main reason why INTELSAT is not meeting
(at least, not economically meeting) the demands of particular users is because of
constraints of its space segment engineering. Goldschmidt, Space Privatization-Who
Benefits?, Development Forum, Feb./Mar., 1985, at 13, col. 1. The INTELSAT sys-
tem was designed to maximize global connectivity for telephone and similar services.
Id. In order to achieve this maximization, however, a satellite's beam must be dis-
persed. Id. As the beam is dispersed, the satellite's power decreases, requiring
larger and more expensive ground stations, or less efficient use of the space segment.
Id.
74. Cygnus Application, supra note 5, at 31-39; RCA Application, supra note 5, at
12-13; ISI Application, supra note 5, at 24-25; Orion Application, supra note 5, at 1-3
through 1-4.
Consider the following: While it currently costs at least U.S.$2700 an hour to
transmit television programming from New York to London via INTELSAT, its sig-
natories, and the necessary domestic communications carriers, comparable domestic
service over the same distance relying on domestic satellites costs only $790. Mar-
key, New Entrants Would Lower Prices, N.Y. Times, Mar. 3, 1985, § 3, at 2, cols. 3, 4-5.
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needs of consumers and force it to respond more rapidly and
efficiently to technological change. This will result in the best
possible service, at the least possible cost.
75
End-to-end rates76 for international transmission services
will be lower for customers of the proposed systems, the Appli-
cants allege, because their proposals eliminate the need to use
the facilities of multiple common carriers.77 Those presently
sending international messages must pay domestic transmis-
sion charges for the distance from their office to an interna-
tional earth station in their country, and then they must pay
the domestic telecommunications administration or entity for
access to INTELSAT. 78 They also have to pay the foreign tele-
communications administration or entity of the nation where
the call is terminated for access to its foreign earth station.79
Finally, they must pay the transmission charges associated with
sending the message from the foreign earth station to the
message's destination. 0 The proposed systems, however, pro-
vide for the "one-hop" transmission of messages, meaning
that an earth station located on or near customer premises will
be able to send signals directly to an INTELSAT satellite, thus
avoiding the detour to the remotely located international earth
station.8 ' Comsat's inflated charges will, therefore, be
avoided.8 2
75. PanAmSat Application, supra note 5, at 26-27; Cygnus Application, supra
note 5, at 31-39; RCA Application, supra note 5, at 11-13; ISI applicatioa, supra note
5, at 27-31.
76. "End-to-end rates" refers to the total cost associated with sending a
message internationally, including payments to other carriers and/or telecommuni-
cations administrations for the use of their facilities. Letter from LeonardJ. Higgins,
Administrator of Regulatory Affairs for RCA American Communications, to Julianne
McKenna (Apr. 17, 1985) (copy on file at the offices of the Fordham International Law
Journal).
77. Cygnus Application, supra note 6, at 40-43; ISI Application, supra note 5, at
7.
78. Letter from Leonard J. Higgins, Administrator of Regulaton; Affairs for
RCA American Communications, toJulianne McKenna (Apr. 17, 1985) (copy on file
at the offices of the Fordham International Law Journal).
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. See generally PanAmSat Application, supra note 5; Cygnus Application, supra
note 5; RCA Application, supra note 5; ISI Application, supra note 5; Orion Applica-
tion, supra note 5 (providing a description of the proposed systems).
82. Cygnus Application, supra note 5, at 43-44; ISI Application, supra note 5, 28-
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Another advantage of competing systems, according to
the Applicants, is that they will further the national objective of
continuing United States leadership in the satellite communi-
cations arena. 3 The Applicants allege that failure to approve
the proposed systems could result in the assignment of the de-
sired orbital slots84 to a foreign administration, meaning that
satellite services between the United States and overseas
points will be performed by a foreign entity.85
A final assertion made by the Applicants is that approval
of their applications will strengthen the United States' defense
communications capabilities .86 Concentration of communica-
tions facilities in the hands of a single or only a few entities,
they say, could potentially harm the national interest during
times of national emergencies.87 Approval of the applications
will increase the number of possible communications routes
that can be used by the Department of Defense, the single larg-
est user of communications services in the world,88 thus
spreading the risk of total communications blackout in the
event of a disaster. 89
In addition to explaining why their proposals will enhance
the public interest, the Applicants are careful to state why their
proposals are consistent with domestic and international legal
requirements.90 The Applicants point out that, although the
83. PanAmSat Application, supra note 5, at 27-28; Cygnus Application, supra
note 5, at 48. The United States' leadership in the satellite field is attributed by
Cygnus to the FCC's commitment to competition and flexibility in regulating satellite
carriers. Cygnus Application, supra note 5, at 48.
84. For a general discussion of orbital slot allocation, see Gold, Direct Broadcast
Satellites: Implications for Less-Developed Countries and for World Order, 12 VA. J. INT'L L.
66, 82-83 (1971).
85. Cygnus Application, supra note 5, at 46-48; see also PanAmSat Application,
supra note 5, at 33-35; ISI Application, supra note 5, at 37.
86. Cygnus Application, supra note 5, at 53-55; ISI Application, supra note 5, at
36-37.
87. Cygnus Application, supra note 5, at 53-55.
88. Petition for Rulemaking of the National Telecommunications and Informa-
tion Administration 1 (FCC Feb. 21, 1985).
89. ISI Application, supra note 5, at 36-37; Cygnus Application, supra note 5, at
53-55. Moreover, according to Cygnus, use of its direct "one-hop" satellite facilities
and their compatibility with transportable earth stations will make the Department of
Defense less reliant on the communications facilities of foreign administrations.
Cygnus Application, supra note 5, at 54; see ISI Application, supra note 5, at 36.
90. PanAmSat Application, supra note 5, at 46-53; Cygnus Application, supra
note 5, at 58-74; RCA Application, supra note 5, at 13-16; ISI Application, supra note
5, at 40-65; Orion Application, supra note 5, at I-5 through 1-6.
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Satellite Act empowered Comsat to serve as the United States'
representative to INTELSAT, nothing in the Satellite Act pre-
cludes the grant of other applications.91 Moreover, that legis-
lation "expressly contemplates the likely existence of addi-
tional [United States]-based international satellite carriers. '"12
The Applicants cite to section 102(d) of the Satellite Act, which
states that Congress did not intend to preclude the creation of
additional communications satellite systems, "if required to
meet unique governmental needs or if otherwise required in
the national interest. '9 3 The meaning of these words is critical
to the determination of whether the Applicants' proposals
should be approved by the FCC.
According to the Applicants, the FCC's Transborder Satellite
Video Services9 4 decision and the legislative history of the term
"national interest" '9 5 weigh in their favor.96 Transborder Services
authorized the use of domestic satellites for services between
the United States and Canada, Central America, and the Carib-
bean, in cases in which such service would not cause INTEL-
SAT significant economic harm.97 The Applicants point out
that, in Transborder Services, the FCC rejected Comsat's argu-
ment that it was granted exclusive authority under the Satellite
Act to transmit all commercial satellite traffic between the
United States and international points.98
The legislative history of the Satellite Act makes it clear
that alternative systems, whether under private or public man-
agement, could be required in the national interest, if the sys-
91. PanAmSat Application, supra note 5, at 1; Cygnus Application, supra note 5,
at 58; RCA Application, supra note 5, at 14; ISI Application, supra note 5, at 43-44;
Orion Application, supra note 5, at 1-5 through 1-6.
92. Cygnus Application, supra note 5, at 58.
93. 47 U.S.C. § 701(d) (1982); see PanAmSat Application, supra note 5, at 1;
Cygnus Application, supra note 5, at 58; RCA Application, supra note 5, at 14; ISI
Application, supra note 5, at 43-44; Orion Application, supra note 5, at 1-5 through I-
6.
94. 88 F.C.C.2d 258 (1981) (memorandum opinion, order, and authorization).
95. 47 U.S.C. § 701(d).
96. Cygnus Application, supra note 5, at 58-60; ISI Application, supra note 5, at
43-44; Orion Application, supra note 5, at I-5 through 1-6; see also PanAraSat Applica-
tion, supra note 5, at 37; RCA Application, supra note 5, at 14 (both citing Transborder
Services, 88 F.C.C.2d 258 (1981) only).
97. 88 F.C.C.2d at 278.
98. PanAmSat Application, supra note 5, at 37; Cygnus Application, supra note 5,
at 58-60; RCA Application, supra note 5, at 14; ISI Application, supra note 5, at 43-44;
Orion Application, supra note 5, at 1-5 through 1-6.
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tem established by the Satellite Act does not "serve the needs
of our people" for any one of a number of reasons. 99 Possible
reasons for allowing alternative systems are that "the rates
charged are too high, or the service too limited, so that the
system is failing to extend to the American people the maxi-
mum benefits of the new technology."100
Orion departs somewhat from the other Applicants in its
interpretation of how the proposed services should be defined.
Specifically, Orion argues that its proposed services are "spe-
cialized,"' 0 ' and thus governed by paragraph (e) of article XIV
of the Agreement,10 2 which requires technical coordination,
but does not impose the test of significant economic harm."0 3
The essence of Orion's argument is that, because it will pro-
vide transmission capacity exclusively through the sale or long-
term lease of its transponders, 0 4 its services are not "public"
and should not be labelled as such.' 0 5 The other Applicants
do not press this argument; they agree that their proposed sys-
tems will provide "public telecommunications services" and
thus submit to the test of significant economic harm. 0 6 Mind-
ful that the FCC may not agree with its interpretation, Orion
asserts that, even if it is subjected to the test of significant eco-
nomic harm, it will meet it. 0 7
The Applicants discuss at length why their proposals will
99. S. REP. No. 1873, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 14, reprinted in 1962 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 2269, 2327 (supporting views of Senator Frank Church).
100. Id.
101. Orion Application, supra note 5, at 1-7 through 1-8. Orion argues first that
its system will not be used to provide any "service," since Orion contemplates only
the sale or lease of transponder capacity. Id. It is highly unlikely that the FCC or
INTELSAT will agree. Orion only hesitatingly states that it may provide "specialized
services." Id.
102. INTELSAT Agreement, supra note 1, art. XIV(e); see supra notes 57-61 and
accompanying text.
103. See INTELSAT Agreement, supra note 1, art. XIV(e); supra note 61 (for the
text of article XIV(e)); Orion Application, supra note 5, at 1-7 through 1-9.
104. A "transponder" is the satellite component that receives a signal from an
earth station, shifts it in frequency, and retransmits it back to earth. HOUSE COMM.
ON SMALL BUSINESS, THE IMPACT OF CHANGES IN THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS INDUSTRY
ON SMALL BUSINESS, H.R. REP. No. 1171, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 54 (1984).
105. Orion Application, supra note 5, at 1-7 through 1-9.
106. PanAmSat Application, supra note 5, at 40-43; Cygnus Application, supra
note 5, at 68-74; RCA Application, supra note 5, at 14-16; ISI Application, supra note
5, at 43-62.
107. Orion Application, supra note 5, at 1-8 through 1-9.
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not cause the INTELSAT system significant economic harm."0 8
They point to four occasions on which INTELSAT has ap-
proved separate satellite systems in the past.' In three of
those cases, the INTELSAT Board of Governors found that
significant economic harm would not be caused by the systems
because it was unlikely that their projected traffic would have
been carried by INTELSAT facilities."' 0 In the fourth case, the
Board did not anticipate significant economic harm to INTEL-
SAT, even though its facilities could and did provide the same
service."' Thus, there is some precedent for looking favorably
upon the applications.
The Applicants assert that many of the customers likely to
use their systems are entities that do not currently use the IN-
TELSAT system, and are unlikely to use it in the near future,
because of its limited service offerings, high prices, and reli-
ance on multiple transmission networks." 12 The primary mar-
ket for Cygnus' proposal, for example, is in the areas of ad-
vanced data communications applications, private voice serv-
ices, and video programming," 3 which constitute a small
percentage of INTELSAT's revenues." 4 In 1983, eighty-two
percent of INTELSAT's revenues were derived from "full-time
services," which consist primarily of phone services. 1 5 Reve-
nues from transponder leases and television service!, services
108. PanAmSat Application, supra note 5, at 40-43; Cygnus Application, supra
note 5, at 69-74; RCA Application, supra note 5, at 14-16; ISI Application, supra note
5, at 48-62; Orion Application, supra note 5, at 1-8 through 1-9.
109. Cygnus Application, supra note 5, at 69-70; RCA Application, supra note 5,
at 15-16; ISI Application, supra note 5, at 50-51.
110. See Godwin, The Proposed Orion and ISI Transatlantic Satellite Systems: A Chal-
lenge to the Status Quo, 24JURIMETRICSJ. 297, 305 (1984). Those three systems are the
Palapa-B system, serving Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thai-
land; the Arab Communications Satellite System (Arabsat), serving several Near East-
ern Countries; and the European Communication System (ECS), serving nations in
western Europe. Id.
111. Id. The fourth proposal, presented by Algeria, involved the use of Inter-
sputnik in communications between Algeria, the Soviet Union, Cuba, and several Eu-
ropean nations. See id.
112. See generally PanAmSat Application, supra note 5; Cygnus Application, supra
note 5; RCA Application, supra note 5; ISI Application, supra note 5; Orion Applica-
tion, supra note 5 (mentioning these arguments throughout).
113. Cygnus Application, supra note 5, at 71.
114. Id.; see INTELSAT, 1983 ANNUAL REPORT 29 (1983).
115. Cygnus Application, supra note 5, at 70; see INTELSAT, 1983 ANNUAL RE-
PORT 29 (1983).
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to be emphasized by Cygnus,1 16 accounted for about fourteen
percent of INTELSAT's 1983 revenues.
1 17
In conclusion, it is the Applicants' contention that, by pro-
viding new, innovative, "one-hop" services, they will attract a
new market, a market currently unwilling or unable to use IN-
TELSAT because of the prohibitively high costs inherent in
providing data and video services through the global system.
Because INTELSAT obtains the majority of its revenues from
voice communications, it has not devoted to the data and video
markets the attention desired by users of these specialized in-
ternational services. For these reasons, the Applicants believe,
their systems would serve the national interest and yet avoid
significant economic harm to the INTELSAT system. An attor-
ney for ISI summed up the Applicants' position: "We ask
nothing of the U.S. government other than to be permitted to
succeed or fail in the marketplace.""' 8
B. The Presidential Determination
Upon the filing by Orion of the first application for a sepa-
rate satellite system, the Departments of Commerce and State
sent a joint letter to the FCC asking it to refrain from taking
any final action on the application until an Executive Branch
group undertook a review of the United States' satellite pol-
icy."19 The group wanted to determine whether, and under
what conditions, authorizing satellite systems and services in
addition to INTELSAT would be consistent with United States
law and treaty obligations, compatible with United States for-
eign policy and telecommunications policy goals, and required
in the United States' national interest. 120
This review was undertaken by the Senior Interagency
Group on International Communication and Information Pol-
icy (SIG), which is composed of the State and Commerce De-
116. Cygnus Application, supra note 5, at 70-71.
117. INTELSAT, 1983 ANNUAL REPORT 29 (1983).
118. Orion, ISI Defend Plans for Private Satellite Systems Before Senate Panels, Satellite
Week, Nov. 7, 1983, at 5 (quoting William Fishman).
119. Letter from David J. Markey, Assistant Secretary-Designate for Communi-
cation and Information, Department of Commerce, and Diana Lady Dougan, Coordi-
nator, International Communications and Information Policy, Department of State,
to Mark S. Fowler, Chairman of the FCC (Apr. 6, 1983).
120. Senior Interagency Group on International Communication and Informa-
tion Policy, A White Paper on New International Satellite Systems I (Feb. 1985).
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partments, as well as other governmental units.' 2' Its conclu-
sion was to favor new entry, subject to some limitations.'
The Secretaries of State and Commerce subsequently for-
warded their recommendations to President Reagan, who, on
November 28, 1984, announced in a memorandum his deter-
mination that "separate international communications satellite
systems are required in the national interest."'' 23 The memo-
randum instructed the Secretaries of State and Commerce to
inform the FCC of criteria necessary to ensure that ithe United
States both advances its telecommunications interests and
meets its international obligations. 24 Additionally, the Presi-
dent directed the United States to consult with INTELSAT re-
garding those systems authorized by the FCC.12 5
A joint letter sent from the Secretaries to the FCC advised
that two restrictions be imposed on any alternative system. 126
First, competing systems should be restricted to providing
services through the sale or long-term lease of transponders or
space segment capacity.' 27 They should not be used to pro-
vide public switched message service, such as long-distance
telephone service.'2 8 Second, one or more foreign authorities
should authorize the use of each system and enter into consul-
tation procedures with the United States and INTELSAT, pur-
121. Id. In addition to representatives of the State and Commerce Departments,
the SIG is composed of representatives of the Departments of Justice and Defense;
the Offices of Management and Budget, Science and Technology Policy, Policy De-
velopment, and the United States Trade Representative; the National Security Coun-
cil; the Central Intelligence Agency; the United States Information Agency (USIA);
the Board for International Broadcasting; the Agency for International Development;
and NASA. The SIG is co-chaired by the Departments of State and Commerce; the
USIA serves as vice-chair. Id.
122. Statement of Recommendations at 1-7, in INTERNATIONAL SATELLITE POLICY (Se-
nior Interagency Group on International Communication & Information Policy ed.
Jan. 18, 1984) [hereinafter cited as Statement of Recommendations].
123. Presidential Determination, supra note 8, at 1853.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Letter from George P. Shultz, Secretary of State, and Malcolm Baldrige,
Secretary of Commerce, to Mark S. Fowler, Chairman of the FCC (Nov. 28, 1984).
127. Id.
128. Id. This recommendation was made in order to discourage entry into the
major markets of intercorporate communications and telephone calls between indi-
viduals. Markey, New Entrants Would Lower Prices, N.Y. Times, Mar. 3, 1985, § 3, at 2,
col. 1.
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suant to article XIV(d) of the INTELSAT Agreement, 29 to en-
sure technical compatibility and the avoidance of significant
economic harm to INTELSAT.'
In a memorandum of law' 3' sent to the FCC as an attach-
ment to the joint letter, the State Department addressed the
question of whether the Orion and ISI proposals were for
"public telecommunications services,"'' 32 and thus subject to
the significant economic harm test, or rather, for "specialized
telecommunications services,"'133 requiring merely technical
compatibility, as suggested by Orion. 4 It concluded that the
'sounder view" is that the proposed services fall under the
"public" heading. 35 A contrary interpretation "would permit
any party to authorize a commercial non-INTELSAT system
for international telecommunications services despite serious
anticipated economic harm to INTELSAT."' 3 6 The State De-
partment concluded that such a contrary interpretation would
undermine the basic purpose of INTELSAT, the maintenance
of a single global commercial telecommunications satellite sys-
tem.
37
The memorandum focuses on the State Department's op-
129. INTELSAT Agreement, supra note 1, art. XIV(d); see supra note 60 (text of
article XIV(d)).
130. Letter from George P. Shultz, Secretary of State, and Malcolm Baidrige,
Secretary of Commerce, to Mark S. Fowler, Chairman of the FCC (Nov. 28, 1984). If
the United States gives its approval to the Applicants, with or without a positive rec-
ommendation from INTELSAT, agreements still must be reached with foreign tele-
communications administrations for the system to become operational. See supra
note 2.
131. Memorandum of Law in INTERNATIONAL SATELLITE POLICY (Senior Inter-
agency Group on International Communication & Information Policy ed. Jan. 18,
1984) [hereinafter cited as State Department Memo].
132. INTELSAT Agreement, supra note 1, art. I(k); see supra note 56 and accom-
panying text (text of article I(k)).
133. Id. art. I(l); see supra note 57 and accompanying text (text of article I(l)).
134. Orion Application, supra note 5, at 1-8.
135. State Department Memo, supra note 131, at 1-2.
136. Id. at 2.
137. Id. The State Department's conclusions were based, in part, on an analysis
of the negotiating history of the INTELSAT Agreements. According to the State
Department's memorandum, article XIV "was a compromise between the desire of
certain European countries, led by France, that the Agreement allow for possible
'regional' satellite systems, and the desire of the Unites [sic] States that other interna-
tional satellite systems be precluded." Id. at 3. Several regional systems have been
successfully coordinated with INTELSAT pursuant to the article XIV(d) tests of tech-
nical compatability and avoidance of significant economic harm. See supra note 110;
see also Transborder Satellite Video Services, 88 F.C.C.2d 258, 275-76 (1981) (memo-
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position to the notion suggested by Orion that "public tele-
communications services" are limited to services provided by
common carriers, and that, because Orion is not a common
carrier, its services necessarily fall within the alternative "spe-
cialized" category.' 3 The State Department asserts that there
is nothing in the text of the INTELSAT Agreement that limits
the concept of "available to the public," a phrase Used in the
Agreement's definition of "public telecommunications serv-
ices,"' 139 to the concept of common carriage, "which is essen-
tially a United States domestic regulatory concept. " 40
The memorandum also rebuts the argument made by
Orion 14 that, because it will be selling or leasing transponder
capacity on a long-term basis, the label "public telecommuni-
cations services" does not apply. 142 Orion argues that the gen-
eral public cannot use capacity reserved for others by lease or
sale.'1 3  The State Department refers Orion to article I of the
Agreement, which expressly includes leased circuits in its defi-
nition of "public telecommunications services. "144
The memorandum closes with a reference to the negotiat-
randum opinion, order, and authorization); Lowndes, Eutelsat Seeks Guarantee of Mo-
nopoly Inside Europe, Aviation Week & Space Tech., Oct. 1, 1984, at 119, 139-143.
It is interesting, considering the United States' original opposition to virtually all
alternative systems, that it would later invoke a provision included only at the in-
sistence of other nations. See State Department Memo, supra note 131, at 3. During the
negotiations for the Interim Arrangements Agreement, supra note 1, the United
States proposed addition of the following paragraph:
Each of the Parties to this Agreement agrees that it will not participate in
any commercial communications satellite system other than the single
global system which is the subject of this Agreement. Nothing in this Agree-
ment shall preclude the creation of additional communications satellite sys-
tems if required to meet the unique governmental needs of any of the Par-
ties to this Agreement.
Washington Plenipotentiary Conference to Establish Interim Agreements for a
Global Communication System of Commercial Satellite Communications, Items 1
and 2, Doc. 5 (July 17, 1964), quoted in Colino, INTELSAT Doing Business in Outer
Space, 6 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 17, 40 n.68 (1967).
138. State Department Memo, supra note 131, at 1-7; see Orion Application, supra
note 5, at I-7 through 1-8.
139. INTELSAT Agreement, supra note 1, art. I(k); see supra note 56 and accom-
panying text (text of article I(k)).
140. State Department Memo, supra note 131, at 4.
141. Orion Application, supra note 5, at 1-8.
142. State Department Memo, supra note 131, at 3-5.
143. Orion Application, supra note 5, at 1-8.
144. State Department Memo, supra note 131, at 4-5; see INTELSAT Agreement,
supra note 1, art. I(k); supra note 56 and accompanying text (text of article I(k)).
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ing history of the Agreement, which reveals that "specialized
telecommunications services" were intended "to comprise
principally those services, excluding generalized telecommuni-
cations, under the direct control of governments as a matter of
special national policy . . . or services provided by govern-
mental . . . entities incident to their functions."'' 45 As the pro-
posed systems are in no way government related, they are nec-
essarily public telecommunications services and therefore sub-
ject to the test of significant economic harm. 146
The paper submitted by the SIG to the Secretaries of
Commerce and State and used by the Secretaries in making
their recommendations to the President sets forth additional
considerations on the issue of competing satellite systems.
47
Among them is the possible impact of FCC approval of the ap-
plications on developing countries. 48 At recent INTELSAT
meetings, many of these states have expressed the fear that, if
significant traffic is diverted from INTELSAT's Atlantic Ocean
region, the consortium would be forced to price its circuits 49
differently, in different regions of the world.' 50 Revenues from
the profitable North Atlantic route would no longer be able to
subsidize less profitable routes to and from developing coun-
tries and prices would then have to reflect the true cost of pro-
viding a specific circuit.' 5 ' The SIG points out that many of
the statements made by the developing countries in opposition
to the proposed systems are based on an interpretation of the
phrase "single global . . . system"' 15 2 as precluding the exist-
ence of virtually any independent system. 15 Such an interpre-
145. State Department Memo, supra note 131, at 8.
146. Id.; see INTELSAT Agreement, supra note 1, art. XIV(d); supra note 60 (text
of article XIV(d)).
147. See generally Foreign Policy Considerations, supra note 1.
148. Id. at 5-7.
149. Although the word "circuits" implies the use of cables or the like, it is also
used in the industry to refer to all communications paths, whether or not served by a
physical connector such as a cable. Letter from LeonardJ. Higgins, Administrator of
Regulatory Affairs for RCA American Communications, to Julianne McKenna (Apr.
17, 1985) (copy on file at the offices of the Fordham International Law Journal).
150. Foreign Policy Considerations, supra note 1, at 6; see Lowndes, FCC Considers
Policy Favoring Competition with INTELSAT, Aviation Week & Space Tech., Jan. 7,
1985, at 24.
151. Lowndes, FCC Considers Policy Favoring Competition with INTELSAT, Aviation
Week & Space Tech., Jan. 7, 1985, at 24.
152. INTELSAT Agreement, supra note 1, preamble.
153. Foreign Policy Considerations, supra note 1, at 6.
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tation, the SIG states, fails to appreciate that the INTELSAT
Agreement envisioned "a single global . . . system as part of
an improved global telecommunications network"' 15" and that
separate international systems already exist and have been suc-
cessfully coordinated with INTELSAT. 55
The SIG found that both the Satellite Act and the INTEL-
SAT Agreement anticipated systems outside of INTELSAT, 56
and that, with certain restrictions,157 the proposed systems
should be accommodated by INTELSAT.15 The issue, as the
SIG saw it, was how to take advantage of opportunities
brought about by new technology and yet, at the same time,
retain the best of the existing INTELSAT system. ' 5  Despite
the economic benefits to the lesser-developed countries of the
status quo approach, the SIG concluded that United States
"economic goals require recognition of the changing market-
place and encouragement of innovation."'' 60
C. INTELSAT
Opposition by INTELSAT to the applications before the
FCC has been strong. The INTELSAT signatories have
adopted a resolution questioning the propriety of United
States approval of competition with INTELSAT, stating that
154. INTELSAT Agreement, supra note 1, preamble.
155. Foreign Policy Considerations, supra note 1, at 6.
156. Id. at 12.
157. Statement of Recommendations, supra note 122, at 6-7.
158. See Foreign Policy Considerations, supra note 1, at 12.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 13. Another foreign policy concern of the SIG was that a substantial
weakening of INTELSAT as the dominant global communications system could po-
tentially enhance Soviet efforts to penetrate developing countries through Soviet
communications satellite facilities. Id. at 9. The SIG noted a recent, more aggressive
effort in commercial space exploration by the Soviets. Id. Melvin Laird, Secretary of
Defense for the Nixon administration and now a director of Comsat, hats expressed
the same fear. Laird, Should INTELSAT Have Competition?, Wash. Post, Dec. 30, 1984,
at C7, col. 5 (editorial). Most commentators seem to agree, however, that Soviet
success in this area is unlikely. See, e.g., Competitive Satellites, Wash. Post, Dec. 30,
1984, at C6, cols. 1, 2 (editorial).
The fear expressed by some nations that United States endorsement of addi-
tional systems would constitute a signal that the United States no longer supported
INTELSAT was dismissed by the SIG as unfounded. Foreign Policy Conside.rations, supra
note 1, at 6. The SIG is correct in this regard. Such a fear ignores the tact that not
all users of international satellite service are desirous of purchasing or making a long-
term lease commitment to one of the Applicants for communications capacity.
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the separate systems challenge the underlying purposes for
which the INTELSAT system was formed. 6 ' INTELSAT's Di-
rector General has called the potential competition a "storm
cloud."' 16 2  The telecommunications agencies of at least
twenty-three member nations have written to the State Depart-
ment and forty-seven to the FCC expressing their concern
about the proposals. 6 '
In 1982, in anticipation of an increased number of re-
quests for consultation and coordination of separate satellite
systems under article XIV, the INTELSAT Board of Governors
requested that the organization's Director General develop
specific guidelines to streamline the process.' 64 Up until that
point, coordinations had been handled on a case-by-case ba-
sis, 165 making it unclear what standards had to be met. In Sep-
tember, 1984, the Director General submitted, in response, a
procedure to be used in evaluating competing systems for eco-
nomic harm. 66 The Reagan administration has opposed the
proposal, claiming that it makes economic coordination with
INTELSAT impossible. 167
The Director General's proposal determines first whether
or not the competing system would provide public interna-
tional services.' 68 If so, INTELSAT would be required to eval-
uate whether the proposed services could be provided by IN-
TELSAT within the period of time proposed by the competi-
161. See INTELSAT Finds Threat in Transoceanic Diversion, Aviation Week & Space
Tech., May 2, 1983, at 19.
162. See Stuart, Intelsat: Time of Uncertainty, N.Y. Times, Nov. 10, 1984, at 31, col.
3, at 34, col. 5.
163. Id. at 34, col. 6.
164. Lowndes, Eutelsat Seeks Guarantee of Monopoly Inside Europe, Aviation Week &
Space Tech., Oct. 1, 1984, at 139, 141.
165. Id.
166. R. Colino, Policies, Criteria and Procedures for the Evaluation of Separate
Systems Under Article XIV(d), BG-60-69E, W/9/84 (Aug. 22, 1984) (INTELSAT
document) [hereinafter cited at BG-60-69E].
167. Lowndes, FCC Considers Policy Favoring Competition With Intelsat, Aviation
Week & Space Tech., Jan. 7, 1985, at 24.
168. R. Colino, Tabulation of Questions to be Answered During the Non-Tech-
nical Coordination Process Under Article XIV(d) of the INTELSAT Agreement, At-
tachment No. 1 to Addendum No. 1 to BG-60-69E, W/9/84, at 17-18 (Aug. 29, 1984)
(INTELSAT document) [hereinafter cited as Attachment to Addendum to BG-60-
69E].
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tor. 169 If INTELSAT could provide the services within the
proposed time frame, it would consider whether any of the
traffic being coordinated would be carried by the INTELSAT
system, if the separate system was not formed. 7 ' If some of
the traffic could be carried by INTELSAT, the Board would
determine an acceptable amount of traffic that the competitor
could divert.'' Next, INTELSAT would assess the cumulative
harm a competitor could inflict over a ten-year period.' 7 2 Sys-
tems still under consideration at this point would then be sub-
jected to an evaluation of their potential effect on INTELSAT
satellite loading in each region of operation. 173
Finally, INTELSAT would consider whether the potential
competitor might hinder INTELSAT's ability to establish a di-
rect link between any two of its members. If INTELSAT could
no longer provide certain satellites, or provide them only at
higher costs and charges due to another system, there would
be prejudice to the direct links. 174
Reaction of the Board of Governors to the Director Gen-
169. Attachment to Addendum to BG-60-69E, supra note 168; see BG-60-69E,
supra note 166, at 18-19.
170. Attachment to Addendum to BG-60-69E, supra note 168; see BG-60-69E,
supra note 166, at 30-33.
171. Attachment to Addendum to BG-60-69E, supra note 168; see BG-60-69E,
supra note 166, at 23-24.
172. Attachment to Addendum to BG-60-69E, supra note 168; see BG-60-69E,
supra note 166, at 24-27.
173. Attachment to Addendum to BG-60-69E, supra note 168; see BG-60-69E,
supra note 166, at 28-30.
174. Attachment to Addendum to BG-60-69E, supra note 168; see BG-60-69E,
supra note 166, at 19-22. Director General Colino has written:
[I]n assessing potential prejudice to direct telecommunications links IN-
TELSAT should consider whether the proposed separate system would in
any way affect the ability of any INTELSAT participant to access or be ac-
cessed through the INTELSAT system. Factors to be considered include
whether any constraints on access to the INTELSAT system are explicit or
implicit in operating arrangements for the separate system, whether the
existence of the separate systems would make it necessary for INTELSAT to
modify its operational plans in a manner which would require modification
or expansion of any participant's ground facilities and whether any other
aspect of the separate system would result in making it more expensive or
more difficult for any INTELSAT participant to communicate via INTEL-
SAT with another.
R. Colino, Intersystem Coordination Procedures: Proposed Procedures for Imple-
mentation of Article XIV(d) Requirements Concerning Prejudice to Direct Telecom-
munications Links, Attachment to BG-61-32E, W/12/84, at 3 (Nov. 7, 1984) (INTEL-
SAT document).
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eral's proposal has been split. Some governors are wary of
conceding too much to INTELSAT.175 The reaction of the Ap-
plicants to the Director General's suggestions has been cool.
They argue that "[n]o sovereign state should permit INTEL-
SAT to erect new, higher or differing consultation standards
. ..particularly where the new standards are clearly an ele-
ment of a concerted effort to preclude new regional sys-
tems."' 17 6 They suggest that the United States oppose the pro-
posal as a "blatant effort to rewrite the INTELSAT Agree-
ment."
177
Although the signatories are not legally bound to abide by
INTELSAT's finding of significant economic harm, 78 the Di-
rector General has reminded the Board that INTELSAT mem-
bers are subject to the article XIV(a) obligation to act, "within
and outside of INTELSAT," in a manner that will contribute to
the achievement of the organization's object and purpose.179
Thus, the establishment of a separate international system, af-
ter a negative recommendation from INTELSAT, might de-
tract from the organization's purpose and constitute a breach
of the Agreement, 180 despite the apparently liberal language of
article XIV(d),' 8 ' which merely requires consultation with the
Assembly of Parties. 8 2
A key factor in determining whether the competing sys-
175. British Governor Geoffrey Hall has been quoted as expressing his govern-
ment's belief that the INTELSAT agreements do not prohibit the establishment of
separate systems. INTELSA T's Colino Seeks to Defuse Criticism of Proposals to Board; Gover-
nors Divided on Coordination Criteria for Separate Systems, Satellite Week, Sept. 17, 1984,
at 1, 2. Another Governor stated: "Nobody expects a country to give up its sover-
eignty for an investment [in INTELSAT] of $100 million." Id. (quoting Algerian
Governor Abdelkader Bairi).
176. INTELSAT's Colino Proposes Further Safeguard to INTELSAT System, Satellite
Week, Dec. 10, 1984 (quoting ISI comments to FCC).
177. Id. David Markey, Assistant Secretary of Commerce and head of the Na-
tional Telecommunications and Information Administration, said of Colino's propo-
sal that it was like "changing the rules in the middle of the game." Senior U.S. Officials
Work at Response to Proposals to Revamp INTELSA T Coordination Procedures, Communica-
tions Daily, Sept. 11, 1984, at 1.
178. Article XIV(d) merely requires consultation with the Assembly of Parties.
See supra notes 67-70 and accompanying text.
179. Review of Obligations, supra note 70, at 7.
180. Id.
181. INTELSAT Agreement, supra note 1, art. XIV(d); see supra note 60 (text of
article XIV(d)).
182. Review of Obligations, supra note 70, at 7.
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tems pose a threat of significant economic harm to INTELSAT
is the percentage of switched traffic that INTELSAT trans-
mits.'" ' It is the nonswitched traffic that may be competed for
by the Applicants, according to the State and Commerce De-
partment's joint letter to the FCC (sent in response to Presi-
dent Reagan's directions). 84 The Reagan administration be-
lieves that eighty-five percent of INTELSAT's North Atlantic
traffic is switched. 85 INTELSAT's Director General sets the
figure at about seventy-five percent. 86
Another source of disagreement between the Director
General and the Administration is whether INTELSAT may
adjust its rate structure to better compete with the Applicants,
should their systems eventually become operative. According
to the Director General and opponents of the new system, to
upset the present pricing policy would be to shift the burden of
cost for the global system to the nations that can least afford
it.' 87 The Director General is adamant that the Agreement
does not allow for the flexible pricing of services and that,
therefore, INTELSAT could not compete with the piroposed
separate systems unless the treaty were changed.' 88
Finally, the Director General denies claims that INTEL-
SAT's present charges are too high.' 89 He has pointed out
that, adjusted for inflation, INTELSAT's 1985 telephone
charge is about five percent of what it was twenty years ago.' 90
A three-minute call between New York and Frankfurt, Ger-
many, costs $4.73, of which INTELSAT revenues are only
183. See supra notes 126-28 and accompanying text.
184. Letter from George P. Shultz, Secretary of State, and Malcolm Baidrige,
Secretary of Commerce, to Mark S. Fowler, Chairman of the FCC (Nov. 28, 1984).
185. Gwertzman, U.S. Expected to Seek Competition to INTELSAT, N.Y. Times, May
2, 1984, at DI, col. 1, at D23, col. 5.
186. Id.
187. See INTELSAT Members Urge FCC to Rject Orion & ISI Applicationg, Satellite
Week, Mar. 26, 1984, at 4. According to Thomas McKnight, president of Orion,
"INTELSAT is marching the poor in front of them so they can sustain an unsustain-
able monopoly in face of this American process." Stuart, Intelsat: Time of Uncertainty,
N.Y. Times, Nov. 10, 1984, at 31, col. 3, at 34, col. 5.
188. Colino, The System Works, Don't Fix It, N.Y. Times, Mar. 3, 1985, § 3, at 2,
col. 3; see Commerce Dept. and Colino Differ on Whether INTELSAT Can Compet,, Satellite
Week, Dec. 17, 1984, at 5.
189. Colino, The System Works, Don't Fix It, N.Y. Times, Mar. 3, 1985, § 3, at 2,
cols. 3, 5.
190. Id. at col. 6.
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about fifty cents, approximately ten percent of the total
charge.' 91 "If the problem is with the total cost of service to
the user," the Director General has said, "why focus on IN-
TELSAT's ten percent, rather than the remaining ninety per-
cent of the charge that is controlled by the Federal Communi-
cations Commission?" 1
92
D. Comsat
Like INTELSAT, Comsat has been adamant in its denun-
ciation of its potential competitors' plans. It argues that, given
the disproportionately high percentage of contracts that NASA
and United States companies have been awarded by INTEL-
SAT, United States industry will suffer if the FCC approves the
applications and INTELSAT sustains significant economic
harm.193 There is also the possibility that FCC approval of the
applications will result in a loss of United States prestige and
influence, and that the Soviets may try to capitalize on this by
recruiting for their Intersputnik system. 194
It is interesting that both Comsat and the Applicants cite
the Transborder Satellite Video Services' 95 decision.' 96 The Appli-
cants use the case to support the proposition that the Satellite
Act did not grant Comsat exclusive authority to transmit all
satellite traffic between the United States and other nations. 97
Comsat, however, uses the case to assert that the proposal
must be "exceptional"' 98 insofar as it would be impossible, un-
economical, or impractical for INTELSAT to provide the
planned services, before the FCC may approve them.' 99 The
burden of demonstrating such exceptional circumstances rests
with the proponents of the planned systems.20 0 Comsat claims
that the Applicants have failed to demonstrate that their pro-
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Orion, ISI Defend Plans for Private Satellite Systems Before Senate Panel, Satellite
Week, Nov. 7, 1983, at 4 (quoting Joseph Charyk, president of Comsat).
194. Id.
195. 88 F.C.C.2d 258 (1981).
196. See Notice of Inquiry, supra note 5, at 8.
197. See supra notes 94-98 and accompanying text.
198. See Transborder Services, 88 F.C.C.2d at 272, 279-82.
199. Notice of Inquiry, supra note 5, at 8.
200. Id.
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posals are in any way exceptional.2 0°
E. Federal Communications Commission
In late 1984, the FCC requested comments from the gen-
eral public and industrial community on the Presidential De-
termination and other issues that have arisen in connection
with the applications. °2 Because the FCC seeks replies to
those comments, it will be over two years from the time of the
first application before any decision is made.20 3
Given the FCC's demonstrated preference for expanded
competition in the domestic telecommunications irdustry
20 4
and recent indications that its preference extends to the inter-
national arena,20 5 it is likely that the FCC will authcorize con-
struction and operation of the proposed systems, although its
recommendation may be qualified by some restrictions. The
White House policy statement 20 6 will certainly serve as an im-
petus to the Commission to approve the applications.
It is clear, however, that the Commission must consider
factors in addition to the Presidential Determination in assess-
ing whether the national interest would be served by 2Luthoriza-
tion of the additional systems.20 7 Recommendations as to the
factors that should be addressed by the Commission in making
its determination are among the comments solicited by the
Commission.0 8
III. ANALYSIS
The United States was at one time so opposed to the exist-
201. Id.
202. Id. at 26; see supra note 11 and accompanying text.
203. The first application was filed on March 11, 1983, by Orion. See Orion
Application, supra note 5; Notice of Inquiry, supra note 5, at 1. INTELSAT has six
months from the date of the commencement of consultation provided for in articles
XIV(d) and (e) to make its recommendation. INTELSAT Agreement, supra note 1,
art. XIV(f).
204. See, e.g., In re Establishment of Domestic Communications-Satellite Facili-
ties by Non-governmental Entities, 34 F.C.C.2d 1 (memorandum opinion and order),
adopted, 35 F.C.C.2d 844 (second report and order), reconsidered, 38 F.C.C.2d 665
(memorandum opinion and order 1972).
205. See Frieden, International Telecommunications and the Federal Communications
Commission, 21 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 423 (1983).
206. Presidential Determination, supra note 8.
207. See 47 U.S.C. § 721 (1982); Notice of Inquiry, supra note 5, at 9.
208. Notice of Inquiry, supra note 5, at 9.
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ence of any separate international satellite system that it pro-
posed the insertion of a paragraph in the INTELSAT Agree-
ment barring them.20 9 However, it now advocates just such a
proposal in the form of the Presidential Determination.2"'
While this change of stance may seem self-serving, vast
changes have taken place in the telecommunications industry
over the last twenty years that were not anticipated by scien-
tists or politicians at the time the Agreement was drafted.2 1'
These changes must be taken into consideration in evaluating
the proposals. Furthermore, despite the United States' change
of stance, it is clearly acting within the bounds of the Agree-
ment as it stands.
There have been many interpretations of the phrase "sin-
gle global commercial telecommunications satellite system. " 212
Some argue that a single global system allows for only one net-
work of satellites that fulfills both domestic and international
communications requirements.2 13  Others argue that the
phrase allows for the development of regional systems, pro-
vided there is only one global system.2 14 Yet another interpre-
tation of the phrase allows for a number of international satel-
lite systems, INTELSAT among them, that are connected into
a single global system.2 15 If the emphasis is placed on the
word "global," one might question, in light of INTELSAT ap-
proval of regional and transborder services,21 6 whether the
phrase now refers to intercontinental, transoceanic service, or
something else altogether. The point is that the Agreement is
209. See supra note 135 for text of proposed paragraph.
210. See Presidential Determination, supra note 8, at 1853.
211. See generally D. SMITH, supra note 23, passim (describing technological devel-
opments); Frieden, International Telecommunications and the Federal Communications Com-
mission, 21 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 423 (1983) (discussing regulatory changes).
212. See Smith, The Legal Ordering of Satellite Telecommunication: Problems and Alter-
natives, 44 IND. L.J. 337, 350 (1969); Trooboff, INTELSAT Approaches to the Renegoti-
ation, 9 HARV. INT'L LJ. 1, 57-65 (1968).
213. See Trooboff, supra note 212, at 57. INTELSAT has approved several sepa-
rate domestic satellite systems over the last few years, rendering this view untenable.
See Colino, International Cooperation Between Communications Satellite Systems: An Overview
of Current Practices and Future Prospects, 5 J. SPACE L. 65, 84-87 (1977); Dalfen, The
Telesat Canadian Domestic Satellite System, 5 STAN. J. INT'L STUD. 84, 95-96 (1970).
214. See Smith, supra note 212, at 350.
215. Id.
216. See generally Godwin, supra note 110, at 304-06 (discussing INTELSAT ap-
proval of five regional and transborder services proposals).
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ambiguous and that all sides can make and have made advanta-
geous use of this ambiguity in their arguments.
In making their determinations, neither the FCC nor IN-
TELSAT should be persuaded by the manipulation of case law
or statutory or treaty language. They should bear in mind the
present status of INTELSAT, the rapid evolution of the tele-
communications industry, and consumer requirements today.
INTELSAT is not a fragile, experimental organization; in
1982, it reported revenues of U.S.$315 million.217 Competi-
tion will serve as a spur to INTELSAT and Comsat to reduce
prices and assure consumers that developing communications
needs are met promptly.
The Reagan administration has not attempted to abdicate
its responsibility to INTELSAT. In his determination, the
President directed that the United States consult with INTEL-
SAT and ordered the Secretaries of State and Commerce to
devise and set forth the criteria necessary for the United States
to meet its international obligations under the Agreements.21 s
The memorandum issued by the Secretaries in response to the
President's request expressly recognized article XIV(d) as the
relevant provision of the Agreement, thus subjecting the pro-
posed systems to the tests of technical compatibility and signif-
icant economic harm.21 9 It is commendable that the Secretar-
ies did not press the weak argument put forth by Orion that
the proposed services be subject to only the test of technical
compatibility. 220
The language of the Satellite Act and the INTELSAT
Agreement supports a procompetitive stance.22' The legisla-
tive history behind the "national interest" language of the Sat-
ellite Act makes it clear that additional satellite systems could
be launched if INTELSAT's services were too limited or too
217. INTELSAT, 1982 ANNUAL REPORT 28 (1983).
218. See Presidential Determination, supra note 8, at 1853.
219. Letter from George P. Shultz, Secretary of State, and Malcolm Baldrige,
Secretary of Commerce, to Mark S. Fowler, Chairman of Federal Communications
Commission (Nov. 28, 1984).
220. Orion Application, supra note 5, at 1-8; see supra notes 101-05 and accompa-
nying text.
221. See Satellite Act, 47 U.S.C. § 701 (1982); INTELSAT Agreement, supra
note 1, preamble, art. XIV(d).
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costly.222 Additionally, the existence of article XIV(d) of the
INTELSAT Agreement evidences that separate systems were,
in fact, contemplated by the Agreement's draftsmen. Further-
more, the Agreement's preamble describes the INTELSAT
system as but a "part of an improved global telecommunica-
tions network.' '223
The Presidential Determination is a practical compromise
because it leaves untouched public telephone service, the
greatest source of INTELSAT revenues.224 It allows competi-
tion for only customized services, services for the most part
either not currently offered by INTELSAT, or only recently in-
troduced by the consortium.225
The cumulative effect that alternative systems may have on
INTELSAT is troubling. What would happen if the present
applications are approved by the FCC and INTELSAT, reve-
nues are lost by INTELSAT, and then yet another Applicant
proposes an additional international system that would divert,
for instance, two percent of INTELSAT's remaining revenues?
Each alternative system, considered independently, would ap-
pear not to cause the INTELSAT system significant economic
harm. However, the result could be a gradual deterioration of
INTELSAT revenues, with INTELSAT serving only the least
economical, least travelled routes.
Despite this possibility, the proposed systems should be
approved. INTELSAT can prevent such a gradual deteriora-
tion by devising, as soon as possible, a clear and predictable
test of significant economic harm that is fair to applicants.
Moreover, the governments of the world's wealthier countries
could replace the present hidden subsidies with open and di-
rect support for INTELSAT.22 6
It is unclear whether INTELSAT's unresponsiveness to
the needs of those desiring customized data and video services
is the result of monopolistic indifference or an inability to eco-
nomically provide the desired services. What is clear is that
INTELSAT refuses to adopt a more flexible posture whereby
222. See S. REP. No. 1873, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 14, reprinted in 1962 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 2269, 2327; supra notes 99-100 and accompanying text.
223. INTELSAT Agreement, supra note 1, preamble.
224. See Presidential Determination, supra note 8, at 1853.
225. Id.
226. Competitive Satellites, Wash. Post, Dec. 30, 1984, at C6, cols. 1, 2 (editorial).
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its services are complemented by those of other systems. Fur-
thermore, if Comsat is inflating its prices, it is responsible for
the high rates currently charged those who communicate inter-
nationally and for the consequent ability of the proposed alter-
native systems to compete with INTELSAT. To alleviate this
problem, the FCC must seriously consider allowing the inter-
national record carriers equal access to INTELSAT, with the
hope that competition for Comsat would encourage lower
rates, at least at that leg of the system.227
The Director General's proposed procedures for deter-
mining whether an alternative system will cause significant eco-
nomic harm to INTELSAT22 is not the answer. It is unpre-
dictable and makes coordination of separate public interna-
tional satellite systems with INTELSAT virtually impossible.
The Director General opposes a change in the INTELSAT
price arrangements on the ground that it would require modi-
fication of the treaty, 229 but in proposing such a radical new
coordination procedure, he is in effect modifying the treaty.
Assuming INTELSAT supports its conclusions with facts
and figures, the United States should abide by any conclusions
drawn by the consortium, despite the fact that a decision unfa-
vorable to the Applicants is not binding on the United
States.2 3  To allow the launch and operation of separate satel-
lite systems in the face of a negative decision by INTELSAT
would be to politicize the organization, bringing about the very
disharmony the INTELSAT Agreement sought to avoid.23'
227. See Petition for Rulemaking of the National Telecommunications and Infor-
mation Administration (FCC Feb. 21, 1985).
228. See supra notes 164-74 and accompanying text.
229. Colino, The System Works, Don't Fix It, N.Y. Times, Mar. 3, 1985, § 3, at 2,
cols. 3-4.
230. See INTELSAT Agreement, supra note 1, art. XIV(d); see supra notes 178-82
and accompanying text.
231. See Colino, The System Works, Don't Fix It, N.Y. Times, Mar. 3, 1985, § 3, at 2,
cols. 3-5. Colino implies that the United States has already politicized :he organiza-
tion. Id.
This is not to say, however, that Colino is correct in interpreting article XIV(a) of
the Agreement as possibly obligating the United States to abide in this case by a
negative recommendation. Such a suggestion renders meaningless article XIV(d),
which merely requires consultation with INTELSAT, and creates an obligation where
none was made to exist by the Agreement's drafters.
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CONCLUSION
INTELSAT faces what may be its most serious challenge
to date as it awaits FCC evaluation of the applications of five
companies to construct and operate alternative satellite sys-
tems. While some view approval of the separate satellite sys-
tems as signaling withdrawal of United States support for the
consortium, others emphasize the very limited nature of the
competition likely to be approved by the FCC. It is imperative
that INTELSAT be flexible in its approach to the proposals.
Specifically, it must consider ways in which it may adjust to
meet the competition. A clearer, more predictable, and less
restrictive test of significant economic harm than that pro-
posed by the Director General should also be devised.
The Presidential Determination is reasonable because it
adequately protects INTELSAT's essential services, while al-
lowing desirable private communications initiatives to go for-
ward. The FCC should adopt the same stance, and the United
States enter into consultation proceedings with INTELSAT.
INTELSAT must undertake its analysis with an open mind and
in good faith, the United States must abide by any reasonable
conclusions drawn by the consortium.
Julianne McKenna
